Abdul Khalik, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
If you want everything you will end up getting a little of anything, or worse, nothing.
Indonesian foreign policy in the last two years or so has been like a teenager who wants so badly to try everything just to prove that she or he exists without thorough calculations of her or his capabilities.
Becoming the first directly elected President, combined with his ability to create political stability, Yudhoyono seemed to have the confidence required to look beyond borders and to be ready place himself among more prominent international leaders.
Throughout the year, Indonesia's presence in the diplomatic arena and many high-profile international issues was undeniably evident.
From Palestine and Israel to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Lebanon, Darfur, Kosovo and Afghanistan as well as regional issues such as the formation of a wider East Asian community and Myanmar, Indonesia has insisted on having a role, or at least getting its ideas on the table.
In the Palestine-Israel conflict, and especially the internal conflict between Hamas and Fatah, Indonesia offered itself as a mediator. In Iraq, Yudhyono offered fresh idea that included forming a joint peacekeeping force primarily comprised of Muslim states, with the country quickly sending its troops to Lebanon under the UN peacekeeping force.
Indonesia also offered its ideas to solve the Kosovo problem and North Korea, while offering police personnel support to Darfur.
If foreign policy is arranged to show that a country is actively engaged in international fora, and hence serves the purpose of image-making efforts for the President, then Indonesian diplomacy, negotiations and foreign activities have achieved at least their short term objectives this year.
But commenting on issues and proposing solutions to international problems will never be equal to actually implementing them.
While proposing ideas is one thing, having them accepted by others, and then raising support for their implementation are the real work of lasting presence and influence. But this needs resources in the form of highly skilled diplomats as well as a vast array of politic and economic heavyweights.
As a middle-power, Indonesia, as Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda puts it, must rely on soft power -- being the world's most populous Muslim country and the country with world's biggest moderate Muslim population as well as a democratic country that has close ties with both developed and developing countries alike.
But 2007 showed that implementing an idea needs much more than the soft power Indonesia possesses. Or at least, Indonesia apparently needs more hard power -- like military and economic capabilities -- to combine with its soft power to be able to implement what it has proposed.
As a result, despite productivity in commenting on and raising ideas to solve international problems, little was heard about how tangible Indonesia's role was in really solving any problems.
At the height of discussions on how to handle the worsening situation in Iraq, and how the international community can help the U.S. fix the country earlier this year, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was quick to offer his ideas to the visiting U.S. President George W. Bush in Bogor, West Java.
Yudhoyono's three-point plan, which included forming a joint peacekeeping force primarily comprised of Muslim states, was a fresh idea. But the plan required Indonesia to show the international community that it meant business.
Indonesia should have declared openly by then that it was ready to send troops to Iraq if it wanted to be taken seriously by others. And it did not because it was not ready with the resources. Apparently, the government seemed to forget to calculate the economic and political costs of involvement in Iraq.
After several weeks of getting the media's attention, the proposal stayed at the level of discourse both because Yudhoyono sensed domestic resistance to the plan -- many people, including lawmakers, raised questions about the risks of sending troops to the war-torn country.
Another example was Indonesia's failure to take any concrete measures in the Palestine-Israel conflict despite its boasts about becoming a mediator.
Early in the year, Indonesia floated the idea of holding talks involving representatives from the Western countries and Hamas as well as other stakeholders in the conflict. The purpose was for Hamas and Western world to reach a better understanding of each other.
Hassan and other officials have mentioned several dates, but the world has yet to see it become a reality. The problem, again, lies in the lack of resources employed for conducting the event because it was not clear if it was even a priority for Yudhoyono with so many other high-profile issues being touched.
Then came North Korea. It has been widely known that Indonesia is very eager to have a role in resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear row because it feels a certain level of affinity with North Korea because of historical ties and unbreakable relations. Since 2006 Indonesia, has spoken of its willingness to act as a "communicator" between the North Korean regime and the Western world.
After sending a special envoy there, Yudhoyono set a plan to visit the reclusive country. But with no guarantee that he would be received by North Korean top leader Kim Jong-il, and hence running the risk of being embarrassed, Yudhoyono canceled the trip, with no plans to reschedule.
The Korean lesson should have taught Indonesia that, again, it needs more than just a soft power to be able to play a meaningful role in persuading a regime. It needs to have the strength that the U.S. and China displayed successfully later in the year when North Korea closed one of its nuclear reactors in exchange for an economic package. And Indonesia doesn't have that.
To some extent, the North Korea case can be applied to Myanmar. Yudhoyono, who has a personal ambition to end the Myanmar problem, should ask himself whether it was realistic to embark on an international mission considering the country's capabilities.
Lack of capabilities in terms of political and economic clout to support an ambition can be seen in Indonesia's unclear role as a UN Security Council non-permanent member throughout the year. It seems that the UN Security Council membership is to help Indonesia improve its international image rather than be used as a tool for fighting for other national interests.
It's like Indonesia is everywhere but nowhere. If the Yudhoyono administration continues its current practice then Indonesia runs the risk of losing of its credibility, with the international community seeing the country as being nothing but hot air.
The bottom line is that Indonesia should set up priority lists on what issues are to be taken on based on its capabilities, and then concentrate its resources on them.
Two examples of how the country showed its ability to really solve a problem when it has the resources to back its ambitions in 2007 were Indonesia's successful involvement in the release of Korean hostages in Afghanistan, and successfully hosting the UN climate conference in Bali earlier this month.
In the hostage case, Indonesia managed to gain the trust of the Taliban and showed its clout in mediating the release of the Korean hostages.
But it was in Bali that Indonesia displayed to the world its diplomatic abilities. Pooling almost all of its resources -- including Yudhoyono himself -- Indonesia managed to persuade the U.S. to join the negotiation process to create a future climate deal, with the EU and developing countries accepting the compromised consensus on the road map.
The Bali meeting should convince Indonesia that it is still considered a big player on the international stage -- plus throughout the year the visits of world leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the country should prove that.
And therefore, it should be clever to capitalize on issues that it can win, and which will benefit the country most, while avoiding being degraded to the level of a nation known for being all talk and no action.
